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Transatlantic relations were going through a deeply troubled phase in the mid-1960s. On this bald fact most contemporary observers and historians seem to be able to agree.
There is, furthermore, a degree of consensus -again between both those who lived through the era and those who have studied it more recently -that this malaise reflected the profound differences between the situation in the late 1940s when the Atlantic relationship had first been institutionalised and the conditions which prevailed two decades later. An alliance, partnership or even 'empire' born at a time of US nuclear monopoly, near total American economic dominance, deep and generalised Western anxiety vis-à-vis Stalinist Russia, and a widespread agreement amongst foreign policymaking elites on both sides of the Atlantic that the fate of Europe was central to the unfolding cold war, struggled to adapt to a world of approaching nuclear parity between the two superpowers, dramatic European economic recovery, the steady rise of East-West détente, and growing US preoccupation with South East Asia seemingly at the expense of Europe. The awkward reality that article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty also identified 1969 -or NATO's 20 th anniversary -as the first point when any signatory of the Treaty could voluntarily withdraw from the Alliance added a further destabilizing ingredient to the mix. 2 Beneath this consensus that there was indeed a problem in Transatlantic relations, there also lurks an element of contradiction, however. This reflects, on the one hand, the growing body of archival evidence which demonstrates that many of the trends which are normally associated with the reassessment of US-European relations which is said to have occurred during Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's period in charge of US foreign policy were evident within the Johnson administration also. And on the other, the emerging consensus in the historical literature that Lyndon B. Johnson's European policy 1 The author would like to thank all of those who participated in the discussions at the Tampere conference for their help in sharpening up the argument of this paper and Dr James Ellison for his perceptive and attentive reading of the text. 2 The Treaty text can be found at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed October 6, 2008).
was much less 'inactive' and far more successful than had often been claimed. Certainly the Johnson administration managed to avoid a major Transatlantic crisis in the later 1960s. Many of the ingredients for a crisis were present, and some dramatic disruption of Transatlantic relations was repeatedly predicted in the second half of the decade. But contrary to expectations, no major storm occurred.
Investigating this crisis that did not happen has the additional merit of throwing up some useful leads to follow when looking in more detail -as multiple scholars are currently doing -at the crisis that did, namely the much more turbulent phase of Transatlantic relations associated with the middle years of the Nixon administration. For this article will suggest that some of the factors on the European side at least which helped avert serious trouble in the 1960s, had gone into reverse by the 1970s and may hence help explain why the Nixon-Kissinger years were as problematic for Transatlantic relations as they are generally held to have been.
There could be trouble ahead…
The obvious starting point for this article is to recall how much talk there was about 14 But it was a problem which reached well beyond a somewhat maverick senator and affected a much wider portion of US public opinion.
When President Johnson met the German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in April 1967
he expressed concern about some of the hostility and mistrust of the US which he had been informed about in the European press and then continued: 'While this was going on in Germany there was a similar type of "unfaithful husband-wife" thinking towards So why was there no crisis? Why were all the doom-mongers -but also those more dispassionate analysts who discerned deep structural difficulties in a partnership forged during the high point of the cold war, but now exposed to the very different stresses and strains of détente -wrong (or at least premature) in their pessimism?
Part of the answer doubtless lies on the American side and the nature of the LBJ approach. This is a field which the present author intends to explore over the next few years, but about which he still knows far too little yet to venture very much by way of an explanation. But this article will also contend that there were a number of factors on the European side which contributed to the crisis that did not happen (and the disappearance of which hence contributed to the one that did during the Nixon-Kissinger era). And it is hence on these European elements in the overall answer that the rest of this contribution will dwell.
The first European ingredient which helped prevent a major breakdown in We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic object of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.
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And for some at least, especially in the State Department, this was almost certainly sincere. 35 But as some perceptive US observers recognised the actual appearance of a structure which might coordinate the stance of European countries could pose serious questions about the existing Transatlantic relationship. As Lawrence Kaplan put it in early 1965: 'we would be concerned if any such negotiation weakened rather than strengthened NATO, were to lead to an inward-orientated "small Europe" with the characteristic of excluding the British for all time, did not promote European integration 
